USA v. Habeeb Malik by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-21-2011 
USA v. Habeeb Malik 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Habeeb Malik" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1395. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1395 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
    
 
Nos. 09-4706/10-1092 
      
 




HABEEB MALIK; IRA H. WEINER, 
 
                                                           Appellants. 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D. C. Nos. 2-08-cr-00614-001; 2-08-cr-00614-002) 
District Judge:  Hon. R. Barclay Surrick 
      
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1 (a) 
on January 28, 2011 
 
Before:  FUENTES, CHAGARES and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
  
(Opinion filed: April 21, 2011) 
   
 
O P I N I O N 
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
On October 2, 2008, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania indicted 
Ira Weiner, Habeeb Malik, and Thongchai Vorasingha with conspiracy to commit 
naturalization fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1425(a).  Count One charged all 
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three defendants with conspiracy to commit naturalization fraud, Counts Two through 
Ten charged Malik and Weiner with substantive counts of naturalization fraud, Counts 
Eleven and Twelve charged Malik and Vorasingha with two substantive counts of 
naturalization fraud, and Counts Thirteen through Sixteen charged Malik with filing false 
tax returns.  
After a six-day trial, a jury convicted Weiner, Malik, and Vorasingha with the 
exception of Count 7.  Weiner moved for a judgment of acquittal or new trial under 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 29(c) and 33, and Malik and Vorasingha joined the 
motion.  The District court denied the post-trial motions on December 7, 2009.  C 
On December 8, 2009, the District Court sentenced Weiner to thirty-six months 
imprisonment, two years supervised release, a $10,000 fine, and a $900 special 
assessment.  Malik was sentenced to thirty-six months imprisonment, three years 
supervised release, and a special assessment of $1,500.  Weiner, Malik, and Vorasingha 
all apealed.  Vorasingha withdrew his appeal and filed an independent motion to vacate 
his conviction that is pending.  On May 11, 2010, we consolidated the appeals of Weiner 
and Malik.  
I.  Background 
From 2000 to 2005, Malik operated a business called the Foundation for Human 
Services.  The Foundation assisted immigrants in obtaining United States Citizenship.  
Pursuant to federal immigration law, a foreigner seeking U.S. citizenship must be 
able to speak, read, and write English and to pass a history and civics exam, along with 
other requirements.  If a person is unable to meet this requirement because of a physical 
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or mental impairment, an applicant is eligible for a waiver with the proper medical 
diagnosis. 
For a fee of $1,500, Malik connected foreign applicants with doctors, including 
Weiner and Vorasingha. Weiner and Vorasingha examined the applicants and filed INS 
Medical Certification for Disability Exemption forms on their behalf.  Weiner and 
Vorasingha certified applicants as  “unable, because of a medically determinable physical 
or mental impairment or combination of impairments which has lasted or is excepted to 
last at least 12 months, to demonstrate an understanding of the English language.” 8 
C.F.R. §§312.1, 312.2.  
In August 2001, Malik started bringing clients to Weiner. Malik paid Weiner 
approximate $120 for each certification of disability INS N-648 form that Weiner 
completed.  Federal agents located a total of 76 forms that Weiner had completed in 
exchange for money from Malik. Weiner testified that he completed a total of 130 forms 
for Malik, finding in every case that the person examined was unable to learn English.  In 
total, Malik paid Weiner more that $10,000 for the examinations and completed N-648 
forms.  Malik made more than $500,000 from the scheme, which he failed to report on 
his tax returns for 2002 through 2005. 
II.  Discussion 
A. The Variance Between the Indictment and the Evidence.  
 
Weiner claims as error the fact that there was variance between the indictment and 
the evidence.  Variance occurs when “the charging terms of the indictment are left 
unaltered, but the evidence offered at trial proves facts materially different from those 
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alleged in the indictment.” United States v. De Cavalcante, 440 F.2d 1264, 1271 (3d Cir. 
1971).  When an indictment charges defendants in a single conspiracy but the 
government instead proves separate, multiple conspiracies, variance has occurred.  
United States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 1989).  The “variance doctrine is 
designed to protect a defendant's right not to be tried en masse for the conglomeration of 
distinct and separate offenses committed by others. The doctrine recognizes that in some 
situations a „jury might have been unable to separate offenders and offenses and easily 
could have transferred the guilt from one alleged co-schemer to another.‟”  United States 
v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Camiel, 689 F.2d 31, 38 
(3d Cir. 1982)).  
We have held that “[a] conviction must be vacated when (1) there is a variance 
between the indictment and the proof presented at trial, and (2) the variance prejudices a 
substantial right of the defendant.‟” United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 287 (3d Cir. 
2007) (quoting Kelly, 892 F.2d at 258).  However, an indictment will be deemed 
sufficient, even if variance occurred at trial, if the indictment  “(1) contains the elements 
of the offense intended to be charged, (2) sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he 
must be prepared to meet, and (3) allows the defendant to show with accuracy to what 
extent he my plead a former acquittal or conviction in the event of subsequent 
prosecution.” Kemp, 500 F.3d at 280  (quoting United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314, 321 
(3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Weiner appeals his conviction on the basis that there was prejudicial variance 
between the indictment and the evidence proved at trial.  Count One of the indictment 
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charged Malik, Weiner, and Vorasingha with a single conspiracy to commit 
naturalization fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.  The District Court concluded, 
however, that the evidence at trial demonstrated two conspiracies --  one conspiracy 
between Malik and Weiner, and another conspiracy between Malik and Vorasingha.
 
 
Nevertheless, even though there was variance, Weiner was not substantially 
prejudiced because there was little danger that the jury would convict one defendant on 
the acts of another (the “spillover” effect).  Kemp, 500 F.3d at 291-92.  Despite variance 
between the indictment and the evidence at trial, the government proved that both Weiner 
and Malik were guilty of conspiring to commit naturalization fraud.  Weiner was 
sufficiently apprised of the charges against him and there was no chance of spillover 
evidence in that both Weiner‟s and Vorasingha‟s conduct was “discrete” and occurred at 
separate times.  See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 774 (1946).  The 
government demonstrated that Weiner engaged in a relationship and agreement with 
Malik, independent from Vorasingha. Weiner and Vorasingha never met or conducted 
business together.  Weiner and Vorasingha's relationship with Malik was separated by 
two years time.   In addition, the jury was instructed to compartmentalize the evidence of 
Weiner and Vorasingha‟s relationship with Malik.  
For these reasons, we conclude that there was no chance of evidentiary spillover 
and that Weiner was not prejudiced by the variance. 
B.  The Jury Instructions.  
District courts have great discretion in determining the language of their jury 
instructions, so long as the instruction adequately states the law. See e.g. United States v. 
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Alkins, 925 F.2d 541. 554 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Hsieh Hui Mei Chen, 754 F.2d 
817, 825 (9th Cir. 1985) cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1139, (1985); United States v. Taylor, 562 
F.2d 1345, 1364 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 909 (1977).  For a jury instruction 
to be reversible error, the error must affect a substantial right and have unfair or 
prejudicial impact on the jury deliberations, resulting in manifest injustice. United States 
v. Anderson, 859 F.2d 1171, 1176 (3d Cir. 1988).   
Weiner contends that the jury instruction here was improper because it did not 
refer to multiple conspiracies but instructed the jury regarding only a single conspiracy.  
The District Court instructed the jury that it must find the elements of a single 
conspiracy:  (1) an overall objective or a continuative core agreement, (2) a common 
goal, common methods, overlap of participants, and (3) a continuous objective that would 
not be achieved without the ongoing cooperation of the conspirators.  However, even 
though the District Court has determined that there were in fact two conspiracies, Weiner 
was not prejudiced by “spillover” evidence from Vorasingha. Weiner‟s conviction on 
various substantive counts of naturalization fraud indicates that the jury was not 
prejudiced by “spillover” evidence and found sufficient grounds independently to convict 
Weiner of conspiracy.  These substantive convictions invalidate Weiner‟s argument that 
the District Court‟s jury instructions were reversible error because of their prejudicial 
effect on Weiner.    
We conclude that because Weiner was not prejudiced by the variance or by the 




C.  Sufficienty of the Evidence. 
Weiner contends that the government failed to prove that he was guilty of 
immigration fraud because the government did not show that he “intended to commit 
fraud.” Weiner argues that the government did not prove that he acted in bad faith when 
diagnosing the applicants.  
Weiner asserts that to prove bad faith or intent, the government had to produce an 
expert to explain to the jury the complexities of a legitimate medical inquiry.  In 
particular, Weiner contends that an expert was necessary to explain to the jury the 
government‟s three main theories of Weiner‟s bad faith:  Weiner‟s insufficient medical 
examination of the applicants, the telling difference between the population‟s percentage 
of mental retardation and Weiner‟s diagnoses of the condition, and the apparent 
normality of the applicants who testified as witnesses.     
We do not agree.  The question before the jury was not whether Weiner conducted 
medically insufficient diagnoses of the applicants but whether Weiner lied on the N-648 
forms.  The jury was never asked, as Weiner contends, to “look at a witness and decide 
whether that person actually has a development or learning disability.” Instead, the jury 
was asked to determine if Weiner filled out the N-648 forms fraudulently and with the 
intent to lie. 
Under the totality of the evidence presented, the jury  could reasonably determine 
Weiner‟s intent and whether he lied on the N-648 forms.  In light of the overwhelming 
evidence of Weiner‟s intent to commit naturalization fraud, “any rational trier of fact 
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could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United 
States v. Smith, 294 F.3d 473, 478 (3d Cir. 2002).  
D.  Weiner was Correctly Sentenced. 
The facts considered at sentencing must be proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997), per curiam; United 
States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 568 (3d Cir. 2007).  A nine-level enhancement was added 
to Weiner‟s sentence because the fraud involved over 100 documents.  Weiner objects to 
the enhancement.  He argues that the facts supporting the enhancement were not proven 
by a preponderance.  He asserts that, because the government only accounted at trial for 
76 N-648 forms, he should not be sentenced based on documents not admitted into 
evidence.   
At trial, Special Agent Krause from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
testified that ICE had located 76 N-648 forms that Weiner had filled out, certifying the 
candidate as unable to learn English. However, Weiner himself testified that he had 
completed 130 N-648 forms and admitted that he certified that each of the 130 people 
whom he examined could not learn English.  
At the sentencing hearing, Weiner objected to the use of 130 N-648 forms because 
“it would be inappropriate for the court to infer and therefore to sentence Dr. Weiner on 
the theory that every single one of the 130 forms the he completed by his own testimony 
was false.”  
The District Court found that “with regard to these 76 forms, the fact that these 
forms were almost identical, based upon the fact that the burden here is by a fair 
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preponderance of the credible evidence, I‟m satisfied that the calculation made by the 
probation office of 130 forms is an appropriate calculation and the enhancement of nine 
levels is an appropriate enhancement.”  
We conclude that the government did prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that more than 100 fraudulent 76 N-648 forms were involved.  
Moreover, the District Court imposed a sentence below the sentencing guidelines 
because Weiner received letters of support from high ranking friends in the community, 
had no prior criminal history, had a history of mental health problems and, in some 
respects, was punished by the reputational harm he suffered as a result of the criminal 
action. For these reasons the court decided to “impose a sentence that is below the 
sentencing guidelines” of 51 to 63 months and instead imposed only 36 months of 
incarceration.  
 E.  Marianne Martino’s Aborted Testimony.  
Malik, in his appeal, argues that Dr. Marianne Martino‟s aborted testimony created 
a negative inference in the jury‟s mind about Malik‟s guilt—an inference that was not 
cured by the court‟s instruction that the jury should disregard Dr. Martino‟s statements.  
Weiner called Dr. Martino to testify as a defense witness.  Dr. Martino testified to 
her relationship with Malik, which began in 2005 when he referred clients to her for the 
same disability testing that Weiner and Vorasingha preformed.   
The District Court interrupted Dr. Martino‟s testimony when she stated that she 
had seen clients referred to her by Malik.  Outside the presence of the jury, the judge 
informed Dr. Martino that anything she testified to could potentially be used against her 
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in a prosecution. She then stated that she did not wish to continue with her testimony.  
Weiner moved for a mistrial, and the District Court denied the motion.
1
 
We weigh three factors in determining if a mistrial is appropriate for prejudicial 
witness testimony:  “(1) whether [the witness's] remarks were pronounced and persistent, 
creating a likelihood they would mislead and prejudice the jury; (2) the comparative 
strength of the other evidence; and (3) the curative action taken by the district court.” 
United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 336 (3d Cir. 2010).  Viewed in light of this test, Dr. 
Martino‟s aborted testimony did not prejudice Malik.  First, Dr. Marino‟s testimony was 
very short, lasting only a few minutes, most of which was taken up by objections.  Nor 
was her testimony either pronounced or persistent.  
Furthermore, the District Court gave a curative instruction to the jury to 
completely disregard Dr. Martino‟s testimony.  Although the abrupt end of her testimony 
may have confused the jury, it is very unlikely that her testimony inferred that her 
relationship with Malik was “criminal” or created prejudice among the jury members.  
We conclude that it was proper not to declare a mistrial on the basis of Dr. 
Martino‟s aborted testimony.  Her statements were short and inconsequential; the breadth 
of the other evidence against Malik is sufficient to uphold his conviction; and the District 
Court took immediate actions to cure any potential prejudice.  
 
 
                                              
1
 Weiner does not appeal the denial of a mistrial in connection with Dr. Martino‟s aborted 
testimony.   
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F.  The Government’s Use of Summary Evidence.  
 
Malik appeals the District Court‟s admission of summaries proffered by the 
government.  However, the use of summaries and charts is proper and may be put before 
the jury with a limiting instruction. United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 213-14 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 1006, summaries or charts may be 
admitted into evidence at trial.  The general rule is that the use of summaries is a matter 
that rests within the sound discretion of the District Court.  Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers 
Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 301 (3d Cir. 1961).   To have a summary admitted, the 
proponent of a summary must lay a proper foundation and show that the summation is 
accurate. Id.  
Malik objected to the District Court‟s admitting the government‟s chart 
representing 76 N-648 forms.  On appeal, Malik contends that the chart “was not 
representative of all the forms that were filled out in connection with Appellant [Malik]” 
and that the chart is unfairly prejudicial.   He argues that by representing only 76, rather 
than the 130 forms that Weiner testified to, the government‟s chart is inaccurate and 
unfairly prejudicial.   
The government‟s exhibit summarized the 76 N-648 forms that federal agents 
were able to locate.  They located only 76 forms because the remaining 54 individuals 
that Malik diagnosed had already been naturalized and the agents were unable to access 
the database of naturalized persons.  The chart reflected that Weiner diagnosed 74 of the 
76 clients with mental retardation, 70 with post-traumatic stress disorder, 69 with 
depression, and 63 with learning disabilities.  
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At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury that “certain charts and 
summaries were offered to you by the government and they were admitted into evidence. 
You may use these charts as evidence even though some of the underlying documents 
and records have not been admitted into evidence. You must decide how much weight, if 
any, you will give to these charts and summaries. That is entirely up to you. In making 
that decision you should consider the testimony about the way in which these charts and 
summaries were prepared.”  
As we held in Prichard, summary evidence is admissible so long as a proper 
foundation is laid and the summary is accurate. Prichard, 295 F.2d at 301.  We conclude 
that the District Court did not err in admitting the summary here.  
III.  Conclusion 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
